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Abstract
This note examines social responsibility in a linear bilateral monopoly by incorporating a cost-reducing R&D investment
and investigates an endogenous timing game. We find that in the presence of R&D, the retailer always adopts social
responsibility irrespective of the timing of the game, but the manufacturer adopts only with its leadership in a sequential
game where it can take the first-mover advantage. We also show that two sequential choices will be subgame perfect
equilibria, but the commitment to the social responsibility by manufacturer is a payoff dominance outcome.
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1. Introduction
The recent topic on the firm’s social responsibility has received increasing attention from broad research in both
empirical and theoretical management economics.1 Numerous studies have also formulated theoretical approaches on
the social responsibility in the fields of business management and applied economics. While most research considered
horizontal models of market competition where the products are substitutes,2 some research examined the vertical5
model of supply channel where the products are complements.
Goering (2012, 2014) and Brand and Grothe (2013, 2015) considered a linear bilateral monopoly with the upstream
manufacturer and the downstream retailer, and showed that the profit-maximizing firm has a strategic motivation to
commit social responsibility to reduce double marginalization problem and thus to increase its own profits. Goering
(2012) and Brand and Grothe (2013) examined the two-part tariff under perfectly coordinated marketing channel and10
showed that the manufacturer can induce the retailer to increase total outputs but its rate depends on the firm’s
concern on the social responsibility. Goering (2014) and Brand and Grothe (2015) also considered the sequencing
choice of social responsibility under imperfectly coordinated marketing channel and showed that a sequential choice of
the social responsibility with manufacturer leadership yields higher profits than those under pure profit maximization.
In this note, we extend their analysis by incorporating a cost-reducing R&D investment under imperfectly coordi-15
nated marketing channel in a linear bilateral monopoly. We show that the retailer always adopts social responsibility
irrespective of whether simultaneous game or sequential game, but the manufacturer adopts only with its leadership in
1For the intensive discussions on the practical and academic issues on social responsibility, see Crifo and Forget (2015) and Kitzmueller
and Shimshack (2012).
2As for extensive works with strategic motives for social responsibility, Fanti and Buccella (2016) examined the network effects while
Lambertini and Tampieri (2015), Liu et al. (2015), Hirose et al. (2017) and Lee and Park (2018) incorporated environmental concern. See
Fanti and Buccella (2016, 2017) and Leal et al. (2018) for more literature on the strategic approaches on social responsibility.
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a sequential game. From the strategic viewpoint of the retailer, its social responsibility can induce the manufacturer to
undertake more R&D investment, which will reduce the wholesale price. However, the manufacturer will adopt social
responsibility only when it is profitable from more R&D investment, which causes higher cost. Thus, the manufacturer20
will take advantage of its leadership in choosing the social responsibility in a bilateral monopoly where the choices of
the social responsibility are strategic complements. These findings also imply that the sequential choice on the social
responsibility critically depends on the efficiency of R&D investment of the manufacturer.
We also examine an endogenous timing game, suggested by Hamilton and Slutsky (1990), and show that two se-
quential choices will be subgame perfect equilibra, but the sequential choice of the social responsibility by manufacturer25
is a payoff dominance outcome. This finding is also consistent with Brand and Grothe (2015). Hence, we can conclude
that the sequential commitment with manufacturer leadership is robust in a linear bilateral monopoly relationship
with R&D investment.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model of a linear bilateral monopoly
with R&D. Section 3 provides the results under the fixed timing of the game and Section 4 provides main findings30
under the endogenous timing game. Finally, Section 5 concludes and suggests further research directions.
2. Model
We consider a linear demand bilateral monopoly framework where upstream and downstream monopolists exist,
respectively, as a manufacturer and a retailer. The retailer is endowed with constant returns to scale technologies that
transform one unit of input to one unit of output. This input is sold by the manufacturer for the wholesale price w to35
produce a final good. The retailer faces the linear (inverse) demand function p(Q) = a− q and no other cost than the
input price w where the trading is conducted through linear wholesale price contracts.
The manufacturer has a constant marginal cost, however, it invest in R&D to reduce the initial production costs. In
particular, we assume that reducing production costs by x units requires kx
2
2 as R&D expenditures where k represents
the inefficiency of R&D investment in the followings:
c(q;x) = (c− x)q + kx
2
2
where c < a and k > k(a, c) ≡ 3a+ c
8c
>
1
2
to guarantee interior solutions where w > 0 and 0 < x < c.
Then, the manufacturer’s profit pim and the the retailer’s profit pir are given by
pim = wq − c(q;x) (1)
pir = (p− w)q (2)
According to Brand and Grothe (2015), we model social responsibility in the objective functions of the firms and
assume that both firms care for consumer surplus CS additionally to their own profits pii for i ∈ {m, r}. Thus, the
firms’ objective functions can be rewritten by:
vm = pim + θmCS = wq − c(q;x) + θm q
2
2
(3)
vr = pir + θrCS = (p− w)q + θr q
2
2
(4)
2
where vm and vr stand for the objectives of the manufacturer and the retailer, and θi ∈ [0, 1] indicates the weights put
on consumer surplus in its objective function. For θi = 0 the firm operates like a profit maximizer while for θi = 1 the40
whole consumer surplus is considered in the firm’s objectives.
The game runs as follows:3 In the first stage, both firms choose its levels of social concern to maximize its own
profits. Given levels of social concern, the manufacturer chooses the R&D investment in the second stage and then
fixes the wholesale price per quantity in the third stage to maximize its objectives. In the last stage, the retailer sells
the product at the final market to the end-consumers.45
3. Results
3.1. Exogenous level of social concern
In the last stage, the retailer maximizes its objectives vr by choosing the optimal quantity q. As a result, we get
the following FOC and the optimal quantity q(w) of this stage:
∂vr
∂q
= a− w − q (2− θr) = 0⇔ q(w) = a− w
2− θr (5)
Inserting the retailer’s quantity q(w) into the manufacturer’s objectives results in the following reduced form
expression
vm =
1
2
(
2(a− w)(w − c+ x)
2− θr +
(a− w)2θm
(2− θr) 2 − kx
2
)
(6)
In the second stage, the manufacturer chooses the wholesale price w that maximize its value vm. Solving this
problems gives the following equilibrium price:
w(x) =
(a+ c− x) (2− θr)− aθm
4− θm − 2θr (7)
A few remarks are in order. First, the effect of each firm’s concern on consumer surplus on the wholesale price is
negative and thus, the wholesale price decreases as the concern on consumer surplus of each firm increases. That is,
∂w
∂θm
< ∂w∂θr < 0: the effect of θm is more significant to the wholesale price. It implies that the strategic motives of50
social responsibility will reduce the wholesale price. Second, the wholesale price decreases as the manufacturer’s R&D
investment increases. That is, ∂w∂x < 0 and
∂(∂w/∂θi)
∂x < 0: R&D outcome will enhance the effect of θi on the wholesale
price. It also implies that the strategic motives of social responsibility for decreasing the wholesale price will depend
critically on the effect on the R&D investment.
Inserting the wholesale price w(x) into (6), we get the following optimization problem and optimal R&D investment
∂vm
∂x
=
a− c+ x (1− 4k + kθm + 2kθr)
4− θm − 2θr = 0 ⇔ x
∗ =
a− c
∆
(8)
3One may consider the reverse order that R&D is implemented in the first stage and then both firms choose its levels of social concern
to maximize its own profits in the second stage. In this case where the R&D decision takes a long-run process, compared to the decision on
social responsibility, the production cost is deterministic at the stage that the manufacturer decides its social responsibility and production
outputs. Thus, the analysis becomes the same with Brand and Grothe (2015) and thus the strategic motives of social responsibility toward
R&D decisions disappear. We thank to an anonymous referee for this suggestion.
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where ∆ = k (4− θm − 2θr) − 1 > 0. Note that the effect of each firm’s concern on consumer surplus on the R&D55
investment is positive and thus, the R&D investment increases as the concern on consumer surplus of each firm
increases. That is, ∂x∂θr >
∂x
∂θm
> 0.
The optimal R&D investment yields the following equilibrium wholesale price
w∗ =
a (k (2− θm − θr)− 1) + ck (2− θr)
∆
(9)
Inserting the optimal R&D investment x∗ and the wholesale price w∗, which is always higher or equal to marginal
costs, into (1)-(5) results in the equilibrium quantity, price, profit and payoffs:
q∗ =
(a− c)k
∆
, p∗ =
k (a (3− θm − 2θr) + c)− a
∆
pi∗m =
(a− c)2k (k (4− 2θm − 2θr)− 1)
2∆2
, pi∗r =
(a− c)2k2 (1− θr)
∆2
v∗m =
(a− c)2k
2∆
, v∗r =
(a− c)2k2 (2− θr)
2∆2
(10)
3.2. Benchmark60
As a benchmark, we consider a standard case of pure-profits maximization where θm = θr = 0. From the outcomes
in (10), we obtain the results in the equilibrium quantity, price, and profit:
qB =
(a− c)k
4k − 1 , p
B =
a(3k − 1) + ck
4k − 1
vBm = pi
B
m =
(a− c)2k
2(4k − 1) , v
B
r = pi
B
r =
(a− c)2k2
(4k − 1)2 (11)
3.3. Timing of social concern
In the followings, we examine three cases according to the timing of the firm’s choice on social concern. In each
case, firms choose θi to maximize its own profits, respectively.65
3.3.1. Simultaneous choice of social concern
Firms simultaneously decide on their level of social concern θi so as to maximize pi
∗
m and pi
∗
r respectively. Then,
we obtain the optimal levels of social concern
θsm = 0, θ
s
r =
1
2k
(12)
It represents that R&D investment can change the outcomes in which the retailer adopts social responsibility in a
simultaneous game. This is contrast to the results in Brand and Grothe (2015), who showed that both the manufacturer
and the retailer do not adopt social responsibility in a simultaneous game in the absence of R&D where k → ∞. In
our model, the strategic motive of social responsibility by the retailer depends on the efficiency of R&D investment70
of the manufacturer. In particular, as the inefficiency of R&D increases, which causes more R&D investment of the
manufacturer, the effect of decreasing wholesale price is lessen and thus the retailer’s social responsibility decreases.
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The resulting profits are, respectively:
pism =
(a− c)2k
4(2k − 1) , pi
s
r =
(a− c)2k
8(2k − 1) (13)
In sum, the retailer chooses positive θr and induces the manufacturer to undertake more R&D investment, which
leads to reduced wholesale price. Compared to the benchmark case, the profit of both firms increase, but the profit of
manufacture is still higher than that of retailer, i.e., piBr < pi
s
r , pi
B
m < pi
s
m and pi
s
r < pi
s
m .75
3.3.2. Sequential choice of social concern with retailer leadership
Using backward induction, the manufacturer chooses its level of social concern to maximize its profit pi∗m. Then we
have the following equilibrium level of social concern
∂pi∗m
∂θm
= − (a− c)
2k3θm
∆3
< 0 ⇔ θrlm = 0 (14)
By inserting θrlm(θr) = 0 into the objectives of the retailer, we get the following optimization problem and equilibrium
levels of social concern
∂pi∗r
∂θr
=
(a− c)2k2(−1 + 2kθr)
(1− 2k(2− θr))3 = 0 ⇔ θ
rl
r =
1
2k
(15)
This finding is the same with simultaneous game in which the strategic motive of social responsibility by the retailer
depends on the efficiency of R&D investment of the manufacturer. This is because the reaction of the manufacturer is
always to choose θm = 0 in either sequential choice game with retailer leadership or simultaneous choice game. Thus,
the retailer leadership does not change R&D investment of manufacturer.80
The resulting profits are, respectively:
pirlm =
(a− c)2k
4(2k − 1) , pi
rl
r =
(a− c)2k
8(2k − 1) (16)
Hence, the results in the sequential choice game with retailer leadership are the same with those in simultaneous choice
game.
3.3.3. Sequential choice of social concern with manufacturer leadership
Using backward induction, the retailer chooses the profit-maximizing level of social concern.
∂pi∗r
∂θr
= − (a− c)
2k2(1 + k(θm − 2θr))
∆3
= 0 ⇔ θr(θm) = 1 + kθm
2k
(17)
In this case, θr depends on θm positively: θr and θm are strategic complements in a bilateral monopoly. Note that θr
is always positive as far as θm in non-negative.85
Inserting θr(θm) into the objectives of the manufacturer, we get the following optimization problem and equilibrium
levels of social concern
∂pi∗m
∂θm
=
(a− c)2k2(1− k(2− 3θm))
8(1− k(2− θm))3 = 0 ⇔ θ
ml
m =
2k − 1
3k
(18)
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The sequential choice of firms’ profit-maximizing level of social concern, whereas the manufacturer determines
before the retailer does, yields the following equilibrium values of θi
θmlm =
2k − 1
3k
, θmlr =
1 + k
3k
(19)
Note that θmlm > 0 if k > 1/2 and θ
ml
m
>
<θ
ml
r if k
>
<2. Thus, the efficiency of R&D investment determines the relative
degree of the social concerns. In particular, if k → ∞, the results converge to the outcomes in Brand and Grothe
(2015) where R&D investment could not be undertaken.90
The resulting profits are, respectively:
pimlm =
9(a− c)2k
32(2k − 1) , pi
ml
r =
3(a− c)2k
16(2k − 1) (20)
Note that pimlm > pi
ml
r . It implies that the manufacturer can take the first-mover advantage in the sequential choice
game with its leadership in a bilateral monopoly where the products are complements and the choices of the social
responsibility are also strategic complements. A higher choice of θm encourages the strategic choice of θr, which also
encourages higher R&D investment. Thus, the sequential choices of the social responsibility critically depend on the
efficiency of R&D investment of the manufacturer. The manufacturer can increase total production outputs with lower95
production costs even though the wholesale price decreases, but the output effects outweigh the price effects. It also
represents that the double marginalization problem can be softened by the manufacturer’s social concern.
Proposition 1. In the fixed timing game, the retailer always adopts social responsibility irrespective of the sequencing
of the game, but the manufacturer adopts only under its leadership.
4. Endogenous Timing Game100
We consider an endogenous timing game in the context of Hamilton and Slutsky (1990).4 Using the equilibrium
results in the fixed-timing game, two comparisons are noteworthy. First, from (13) and (16), we have pism = pi
rl
m and
pisr = pi
rl
r . Thus, both the manufacturer and the retailer are indifferent between a simultaneous game and a sequential
game with the retailer’s leadership. Second, from (13) and (20), we have pism < pi
ml
m and pi
s
r < pi
ml
r for any k >
3a+c
3a+5c .
Thus, in the presence of R&D, a sequential game with the manufacturer’s leadership is preferable to both firms if the105
inefficiency of R&D investment is not too low.
Proposition 2. In the endogenous timing game, (i) both sequential choices are the equilibria, but simultaneous choice
is not an equilibrium and (ii) a sequential choice with manufacturer leadership is a payoff dominant equilibrium.
4The endogenous timing game in the context of social responsibility was examined by Kopel and Brand (2012) and Fanti and Buccella
(2017). It is also recently expanded to the other context in a mixed oligopoly. See, for example, Matsumura and Ogawa (2014) and Lee
and Xu (2018).
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It represents that sequential choices of the social responsibility by the manufacturer’s leadership increases the
manufacturer’s profits as well as the retailer’s profits.5 This finding also consistent with Brand and Grothe (2015)110
and thus we can conclude that the sequential commitment with manufacturer leadership is robust in a linear bilateral
monopoly relationship with R&D investment.
5. Concluding Remarks
We examined the strategic motives of social responsibility in a linear bilateral monopoly and emphasized its
relationship with R&D decision of the manufacturer. We showed that the retailer always adopts social responsibility115
irrespective of the timing of the game, but the manufacturer adopts only with its leadership in a sequential game
where the choices of the social responsibility are strategic complements. We also showed that the sequential choice on
the social responsibility critically depends on the efficiency of R&D investment of the manufacturer.
As future research, it is needed to examine two-part tariffs under perfectly coordinated marketing channel and
compare with the results under imperfectly coordinated marketing channel. In this case, as Chen et al. (2016) proposed,120
a bilateral duopoly model is also an important research direction. Finally, as Matsumura and Matsushima (2015)
worked, not only the manufacturers but the retailers often engage in R&D investments such as service innovation and
quality management.6 Thus, the interplay between the strategic motives of social responsibility will be affected by
the bargaining power because both the manufacturer and the retailer can be main players in the game. We leave it as
further research.125
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Appendix A. The case where the retailer engages in the service R&D of sales promotion
In this case the retailer faces the linear (inverse) demand function p(Q) = a+ y − q where y is demand-enhancing
effect from the service R&D of sales promotion and the innovative service effort is given by y
2
2 . Then, the retailer’s
profit pir becomes
pir = (a+ y − q − w)q − y
2
2
(A.1)
In the last stage, the retailer maximizes its objective vr by choosing the optimal quantity q. As a result, we get
the following optimal quantity q(w) of this stage:
q(w) =
a− w + y
2− θr (A.2)
Inserting (A.2) in eq.(3) we obtain the following reduced form of the manufacturer’s objective:
vm =
(a− w + y)2θm
2 (2− θr) 2 +
(−c+ w + x)(a− w + y)
2− θr −
kx2
2
(A.3)
In the third stage, the manufacturer chooses the wholesale price w that maximize its value vm. Solving this problem
gives the following equilibrium price:
w(x, y) =
(a+ c− x+ y) (2− θr)− (a+ y)θm
4− θm − 2θr (A.4)
Note that the wholesale price increases as the retailer’s R&D in service increases. That is, ∂w∂y > 0.
In the second stage, making use of (A.4), both firms choose, simultaneously and independently the level of its R&D
investment, x and y, that maximizes vm and vr respectively. Then, we obtain the optimal levels of R&D investment:
x∗ =
(a− c) (4− θm − 2θr)
∆
; y∗ =
(a− c)k (2− θr)
∆
(A.5)
where ∆ = k
(
14 + θ2m − 4θm (2− θr)− 15θr + 4θ2r
)− 4 + θm + 2θr. Note that both manufacturer and retailer’s R&D
levels increases as the concern on consumer surplus of each firm increases. That is ∂x
∗
∂θi
> 0 and ∂y
∗
∂θi
> 0.
The optimal R&D investments levels yield the following equilibrium wholesale price
w∗ =
ck (2− θr) (3− θm − 2θr) + a (4− θm − 2θr) (2k − kθm − kθr − 1)
∆
(A.6)
Inserting the optimal R&D investment levels x∗ and y∗ and the wholesale price w∗, into eq.(1) and (A.1) results170
in the equilibrium profits:
pi∗m =
(a− c)2k (4− θm − 2θr) 2 (4k − 2kθm − 2kθr − 1)
2∆2
;
pi∗r =
(a− c)2k2 (2θ2m (1− θr) + (2− θr) 2 (7− 8θr)− 8θm (2− 3θr + θ2r))
2∆2
(A.7)
Finally, we examine the timing of social responsibility between the manufacturer and the retailer in the case that
both firms undertake R&D investments. For the sake of easy comparisons, we will use a numerical example where
a = 100 and c = 10 and k = 1 and compare with our original results.
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Table A.1: Optimal levels of social responsibility (θ∗m, θ∗r )
Timing of social concern Simultaneous choice Retailer leadership Manufacturer leadership
with retailer’s service (0.734, 0.723) (0.738, 0.712) (0.739, 0.723)
original results (0, 0.5) (0, 0.5) ( 13 ,
2
3 )
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